Hearing and Deciding Disputed Workmen\u27s Compensation Cases by Reid, J. J.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 14 Issue 4 Article 2 
Summer 1962 
Hearing and Deciding Disputed Workmen's Compensation Cases 
J. J. Reid 
South Carolina Industrial Commission 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James J. Reid, Federal Employers Liability Act, 14 S. C. L. Rev. 457 (1961-1962). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
HEARING AND DECIDING
DISPUTED WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES'
JAMES J. REM*
The South Carolina Industrial Commission exercises min-
isterial and quasi-judicial powers in administering the Work-
men's Compensation Act. The Commission is empowered to
find the facts, make conclusions of law, and render decisions
in disputed cases after hearing the parties and their wit-
nesses.2 Most of the Commission's decisions turn on findings
of fact which are not reviewable by the courts,3 and this is an
exercise of tremendous power, with great social and economic
consequences.
As an administrative tribunal, the Industrial Commission
is empowered to conduct hearings in a summary manner.
4
What comprises a summary manner is not spelled out by the
Act nor court decisions. The court has simply stated that the
Industrial Commission has broad powers of discretion in all
procedural matters.5 Nevertheless, there are definite limits
upon these powers of discretion. The old legal truism, "Sub-
stantive rights are never greater than procedural rights",
applies equally to workmen's compensation as any of the older
areas of the law; and as such, compels a hearing commissioner
to observe the rule which remains constant, that he be fair
and reasonable in receiving and evaluating evidence.
Relaxation of common law rules of evidence for purposes of
workmen's compensation hearings by statutory command that
hearings be conducted in a summary manner has given rise
to some loose concepts of procedural rights and evidentiary
values. The constitutional rights of parties to due process
*Member, South Carolina Industrial Commission.
1. See CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 72 et seq. (1952).
2. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 72-354 (1952): The Commis-
sion or any of its members shall hear the parties at issue and their
representatives and witnesses and shall determine the dispute in a sum-
mary. manner. The award, together with a statement of the findings of
fact, rulings of law and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue,
shall be filed with the record of the proceedings and a copy of the award
shall immediately be sent to the parties in dispute.
3. Steed v. Mount Pleasant Seafood Co., -- S.C. -; 113 S.E.2d 827
(1946); and all cases cited therein.
4. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 72-354 (1952).
5. Gurley v. Mills Mill, 225 S.C. 46; 80 S.E.2d 745 (1946).
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must always be observed." Each party is entitled to proper
notice of issues to be tried and to a fair and impartial hearing,
and to have its evidence received and evaluated in a fair and
reasonable manner. But what stands as a standard of "fair
and reasonable"? The common law principles of evidence or
something less? Nothing is to be found in any decision of our
court or courts of other jurisdictions in this country that any
standard differing with common law principles of evidence
may be employed by administrative tribunals. Our courts
have said that the niceties of pleading and process in law
courts cannot be required of the Industrial Commission with-
out violating the spirit and philosophy of workmen's compen-
sation.7 This does not mean that any information offered
could be accepted and relied upon as legal evidence, nor, that
the Commission should not attempt to keep the testimony
material and relevant to the issues. It does mean that the
Industrial Commission would not be held to the responsibility
of the judge who, as with a surgeon's knife, must carefully
separate the wheat from the chaff in deciding what is legal
evidence. The most notable relaxation allowed by our court
in common law principles of evidence in matters before the
Industrial Commission, has been to allow as admissible certain
hearsay evidence. But even this certain hearsay evidence is
required to be corroborated by some other evidence in order to
take on probative value.8 Our court has stated that it is not
reversible error for the Commission to receive as evidence
that which is incompetent and prohibited by common law
principles of evidence when such so-called evidence is harm-
less, not prejudicial to either party, and not relied upon in
the determination. 9 It is clear that although the Industrial
Commission may open wide its gates for receiving evidence,
6. Ham v. Mullins Lumber Co., 193 S.C. 66, 7 S.E.2d 712 (1939): Mc-
Donald v. Palmetto Theaters, 196 S.C. 460, 13 S.E.2d 602 (1941); Buggs
v. U. S. Rubber Co., 201 S.C. 281, 22 S.E.2d 881(1943); Simon v. Strock,
209 S.C. 134, 39 S.E.2d 209 (1946); Jones v. Anderson, 205 S.C. 247, 31
S.E.2d 447 (1944).
7. King v. Wesner, 198 S.C. 49, 16 S.E.2d 289 (1940).
8. Spearman v. F. S. Royster Guano Co., 188 S.C. 393, 199 S.E. 530
(1937) ; Rice v. Brandon Corp., 190 S.C. 229, 2 S.E.2d 740 (1938) ; Jeffers
v. Manetta Mills, 190 S.C. 435, 3 S.E.2d 489 (1938); Cole's Next of Kin v.
Anderson Cotton Mills, 191 S.C. 458, 4 S.E.2d 908 (1939); Ham v. Mullins
Lumber Co., supra; Ervin v. Myrtle Grove Plantation, 206 S.C. 41, 32
S.E.2d 877 (1945); Sligh v. Newberry Electric Co-op., Inc., 216 S.C. 401,
58 S.E.2d 675 (1950); Prince, Dec. v. C. Y. Thomason Co., - S.C. __, 113
S.E.2d 758 (1950); Corley v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, - S.C. _-, 117 S.E.2d 577
(1960).
9. Sligh v. Newberry Electric Co-op., Inc., supra.
[Vol. 14
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss4/2
WORKMEN'S- COMPENSATION CASES
it is still held accountable to base its findings and decisions
upon reliable and competent evidence pertaining to the stand-
ards of legal evidence, established as common law rules of
evidence.' 0
In evaluating evidence, we cannot say that legal, com-
mon law evidence under every circumstance is of a higher
quality or had more probative value than evidence which
would be excluded or inadmissible under the common law.
Regardless of its legality, evidence is either of good or
inferior quality with gradations in between.
There has never been any scientific or even pseudo-
scientific formula by which evidence could be evaluated.
There have only been certain established aids, such as the
hearsay evidence rule, and other exclusionary rules which
have evolved in the common law and in our civil pro-
cedural statutes. Most common law and statutory rules
of evidence were devised in order to assist juries in
making their determinations. Instead of allowing the
juror to assess the weight of hearsay hit or miss, the law
merely excluded it. On the other hand, there are as many
exceptions to the hearsay rule as there are applications
of it. In many instances, legal evidence may be the only
desirable basis for deciding the issues because of the
inferior quality of all of the rest of the evidence presented.
Experience and time have shown us that legal or common
law evidence has been most consistently of a higher
quality than inadmissible evidence, but not that it has
been exclusively of a higher quality. Hearsay evidence
may more often than not be inferior to direct evidence,
10. Murdaugh v. Robert Lee Constr. Co., 185 S.C. 497, 194 S.E. 447
(1937); Bannister v. Shepherd, 191 S.C. 165, 4 S.E.2d 7 (1939); Ham
v. Mullins Lumber Co., supra; Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157,
14 S.E.2d 889 (1941); Smith v. Fulmer, 198 S.C. 91, 15 S.E.2d 681 (1941);
Ferguson v. State Highway Dep't., 197 S.C. 520, 15 S.E.2d 775 (1941);
King v. Wesner, supra; Young v. Hyman Motors, Inc., 199 S.C. 233, 19
S.E.2d 109 (1942); Cromer v. Newberry Cotton Mills, 201 S.C. 349, 23
S.E.2d 19 (1942); Smith v. Southern Builders, Inc., 202 S.C. 88, 24 S.E.2d
109 (1942); Anderson v. Campbell Tile Co., 202 S.C. 54, 24 S.E.2d 104
(1942); Strawhorn v. J. A. Chapman Constr. Co., 202 S.C. 43, 24 S.E.2d
116 (1942); Jones v. Anderson Cotton Mills, 205 S.C. 247, 31 S.E.2d 447
(1944); Ervin v. Myrtle Grove Plantation, supra; Ripley v. Anderson
Cotton Mills, 209 S.C. 401, 40 S.E.2d 508 (1946); Durant v. Ancor Corp.,
209 S.C. 509, 41 S.E.2d 96 (1947); Hines v. Pacific Mills, 214 S.C. 125,
51 S.E.2d 383 (1949); White v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 215 S.C. 25,
53 S.E.2d 872 (1949); Falconer v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 215 S.C. 321, 54
S.E.2d 904 (1949): Schrader v. Monarch Mills, 215 S.C. 357, 55 S.E.2d 285
(1949); Sligh v. Newberry Elec. Co-op., Inc., supra; Black v. Town of
Springfield, 217 S.C. 413, 60 S.E.2d 854 (1950).
1962]
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but where no other type of evidence is available, and the
testimony is presented by a witness whose veracity is
convincing, and the sum total of the evidence is 'the
kind of evidence on which responsible persons are ac-
customed to rely in serious affairs', it has great probative
weight. The problem confronting the referee is one of
selection of quality, rather than the lawyer-like job of
merely adding up admissible evidence and subtracting the
legally exclusionary evidence. Simply stated, his job is to
be reasonable and fair.
There may have been an impression that since the
Workmen's Compensation law permits freedom of proce-
dure and a relaxation of legal rules of evidence, and since
the law contains seemingly sweeping presumptions, that
the board and its referees must accept all evidence pre-
sented as well as the inference drawn from such evidence
as being probative and worthy of belief. Of course, this
is not true. The referee is merely in a more difficult
position than a jury or judge, because out of a morass of
both high quality and inferior quality evidence, he must
separate the wheat from chaff, deciding the issues on
substantially supportable evidence."'
In hearing cases, the Industrial Commission has the duty to
follow the legislative mandate to make applicable the remedies
of the Workmen's Compensation Act wherever possible by
construing the law broadly and in manner most favorable to
claimants, and to do this short of violence to the plain meaning
of the Act.12
There is a distinct difference between construing the Work-
men's Compensation Act, the law that is, in a liberal manner
and the correct fashion for evaluating evidence.13 Evidence
is simply a search for truth. Of necessity, we settle at times
on that which best represents the probable truth. The moving
party always has the burden of establishing by competent
evidence facts sufficient to support an award arrived at by a
liberal application of the law, and the final findings of de-
terminative facts must rest upon the preponderance of the
evidence related thereto as a predicate for any award. As
11. "Evaluation of Evidence in New York State Workmen's Compen-
sation Proceedings", 18 ALBANY LAw REvIEw, 157 (1954).
12. Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., supra; McWilliams v. Southern Bleach-
ery & Print Works, 216 S.C. 121, 57 S.E.2d 26 (1949).
13. Cross v. Concrete Materials, - S.C. -, 114 S.E.2d 828 (1960).
[Vol. 14
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss4/2
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES
to these findings, there is no presumption of compensability
favoring a claimant. 4 Moreover, in certain classes of cases,
there is a presumption against compensability. 15
Evidence is to be received and evaluated in a fair and
reasonable manner. Findings must be based upon a conviction
which the trier of the facts derives from the preponderance
of competent evidence. This is a search for truth under rules
of fair play and has nothing to do with any notion of whether
a hearing officer is a liberal, a conservative, or fits any other
word description of personality or human weakness.
Methods of evaluating evidence cannot be spelled out in neat
mathematical terms nor precise standards of logic. Evaluat-
ing evidence requires a mind sensitive to and bent upon doing
what is right and what is just; and in the process committed,
insofar as human nature permits, to being objective, dispas-
sionate And very careful in using the tools at hand for dis-
cernment of that information which is worthy of belief and
that which represents the weight of the evidence. Evaluating
evidence requires the trier of the facts to be well informed,
not "half-baked" in his ideas or notions, nor overcome by the
prestige, articulation or erudition of any party or his witnesses
or his lawyer. In short, a good trier of facts will question and
test everything presented to him as representative of a fact,
or test any expert opinion given in lieu of a fact by standards
of high ethics and intelligence; and with a spirit of humility
be firm of purpose in deciding the rights and remedies of the
parties before him for judgment.
Being the judge and the jury assumes fearful responsibili-
ties. Acting as both the judge and the jury increases the
awesome fear of failing to be right and to be just. Judge
Newton D. Baker said many years ago, in referring to his
responsibilities as a federal judge, that his only fear was
that in some moment of human weakness or abstraction, he
would make a decision doing an injustice to one of the parties,
and that this fear drove him to burn the midnight oil in
studying the facts and the law applicable thereto in all of his
cases.
This fear becomes the guardian Hermes of the decision
maker's responsibility to be fair and impartial; to do what is
14. Hines v. Pacific Mills, supra.
15. Price v. B. F. Shaw Co., 224 S.C. 80, 77 S.E.2d 491 (1953).
19621'
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right and just; to rise above self and strive to be as "blind
justice", dispassionate and objective; and to utilize fully the
lessons of experience and sound reasoning in passing upon
the rights of parties in accordance with law.
Recently, our court stated that;
The duty to determine the factual issues is placed solely
on the Commission, and neither this Court, nor the circuit
court, has authority to determine factual issues, except in
jurisdiction matters. This duty on the part of the Com-
mission requires that, not only must findings of fact be
made upon the essential factual issues, but that they be
sufficiently definite and detailed to enable the appellate
court to properly determine whether the findings of fact
are supported by the evidence and whether the findings
of fact are supported by the evidence and whether the
law has been properly applied to those findings. 58 Am.
Jur. 878, Section 472. And 'where there is a noncom-
pliance by a compensation tribunal with the requirement
of express findings and the cause remanded to the tri-
bunal, in order that it may conform to the requirement,
either with or without a new hearing of the parties, as the
exigencies of a case may be.' 58 Am. Jur. 879, Section
476. Annotation: 146 A.L.R. 123, 197.
We have followed the foregoing rule in cases where
there was a failure to make findings of fact by the Com-
mission or the findings made were lacking in sufficient
definiteness. Gray v. Laurens Mills, et al., 231 S.C. 488, 99
S.E.2d 36 (1957) ; Haipe v. Kline Iron & Metal Works, et
aL, 219 S.C. 527, 66 S.E.2d 30 (1951) ; Dameron v. Spar-
tan Mills, et al., 211 S.C. 217, 44 S.E.2d 465 (1947) ; Shil-
linglaw v. Springs Cotton Mills, et al., 209 S.C. 379, 40
S.E.2d 502 (1946). In the Gray case, it was stated that
'the Commission should make such specific and definite
findings upon the evidence reported as will enable this
Court to determine whether the general finding or con-
clusion shall stand, particularly when there are material
facts at issue. 10
Administrative tribunals exist not solely as a result of
much regulatory and social legislation at the state and federal
16. Drake v. Raybestos-Blanhattan, Inc., Smiths Advance Sheet (S.C.
Sept. 8, 1962).
[Vol. 14
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levels, but because it was believed that these tribunals would
be made up of men and women who would become experts
as triers of the facts, efficient and expeditious in their in-
quiries and decision making, and would not be misled into
error in relying upon unreliable and incompetent evidence;
and that with a growing training and experience that the
ideas of efficiency, speed, and fair play, would become, for
administrative tribunals, more and more a strong and stable
standard for fact finding and decision making.
The Workmen's Compensation Act, and the decisions of our
court, command the Industrial Commission to make clear, spe-
cific, and comprehensive findings as to all issues in question. It
seems, as an aid to this end, that a ready reference format
and check-list was needed by a trier of the facts and by the
practitioner who has the responsibility of building the record
upon which the trier of the facts must decide. Accepting the
awareness of this need, an attempt has been made to draft
such a format and outline check-list of aspects which are
usually present as an issue in all workmen's compensation
cases. This format and check-list is designed primarily as a
work sheet. It presents alternative facts for selection as they
may appear in a given case, allowing for extension of either
finding when required. It also presents a systematic outline
with continuity of matters which usually are in dispute and
concerning which a finding of fact and conclusion of law must
be made. Since it is now clear that not to make specific find-
ings on all issues is reversible error, causing remand for
further procedure, such a format and check-list is highly de-
sirable so that a report of a case with decision will be complete.
Moreover, it seems desirable that words and phrases used for
expressing findings on issues which are common should be
concise and uniform from case to case. Thus, a language
peculiar but concisely fitting for answering factual and legal
problems which arise under the Act and for orders of deter-
'mination free of vagueness and ambiguity is recommended.
This would promote better understanding among members of
the bar of what has been decided. For these reasons, this for-
mat has been developed with hope that it will prove of some
assistance to those of us who labor in this field of law.
1962]
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WORK SHEET
FOR
DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE
SOUTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
DOCKET NO.
,DECEASED EMPLOYEE
- ------- - CLAIMANT(S)
VS
, AND
- -------- DEFENDANT(S)
G(S): Held ,19 at
Last Reference Filed ,19-
ANCES: Claimant(s) represented by
Attorney(s) at Law,
South Carolina, with Mr.
appearing.
Defendant(s) represented by
Attorney(s) at Law,
South Carolina, with Mr.
appearing.
V OF HEARING: To determine
DECISION AND ORDER: By Commissioner.
FILED: ,19
This case was heard by the undersigned Commissioner
19 , at
with last reference filed , 19
The claimant(s)
(hereinafter called the employee) (is) (are) claiming medical benefits and
(death) compensation for (total) (partial) (specific) (general) disability
and serious (bodily) (facial or head) disfigurement based upon alleged
covered "injury" ("death") occurring , 19
8
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under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act. Code of Laws of
South Carolina, 1952, Title 72. The defendant(s) (admitted) (denied)
liability (and) (but) contended that
Synopsis of Evidence:
The question(s) to be decided (is) (are):
Reasons for Decision:
A record as is necessary for decision was made at the hearing(s), and
is duly recorded, and with the filing of deposition(s) and stipulation(s),
with last reference filed , 19 - , the case was closed.
After due consideration of the claim and the defenses thereto, and
based upon all the evidence are the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That the parties are subject to and bound by the South Carolina
Workmen's Compensation Act as amended; that on and about
19., the employee (was) (was not) employed by
(employer)
9
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, which was operating under the
Act at that time (as a self-insurer) with
(carrier)
as its insurance carrier.
2. That the employee, while employed as a
(occupation)
for the employer on or about - , 19., (was) (was not) engaged
in
(Work alleged)
and while so engaged (did) (did not)
(incident alleged)
and the employee as a result of this incident (did) (did not) suffer bodily
injury (disease) consisting of
(part of body injured)
3. That the pre-injury average weekly wage was , and the
weekly compensation rate is $ , (which is the maximum
allowed by the Act.)
4. That the employee as a result of the injury of .,
19 - (has) (has not) been disabled (as follows:)
A. Total disability ,19 -, to .,
19--;
(for the period of - weeks); and
B. Partial loss of wage earning capacity (disability) in the
amount of $ per week for the period of
19 -. to , 19 _; weeks; and
C. Total disability (Partial disability of $
per week loss of wage earning capacity) continuing on
, 19 -, and is such that it will
(date of last hearing)
continue indefinitely thereafter.
5. That the employee has received (all) (compensation due and payable
to , 19 -) ( disability compensation due and
payable for the period(s) of ,19 to
19 _; and
(and compensation payments were stopped upon application duly made and
by Order of the Industrial Commission issued on ,19-)
6. That the employee's injury required medical examination and treat-
ment for relief (for cure); and that after ten (10) weeks following the
injury, the employee continued to have disability as follows:
A. Total (Partial) disability , 19 - to
19 -; and
[Vol. 14
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B. Specific loss (disability) of the
(member of body)
which (had not) (did not) reach(ed) maximum of healing
(on) (until) , 19 -; and
C. That the injury after the first ten (10) weeks required
medical treatment, and the treatment was (and is) such as
would tend to restore the employee's physical function, and
that such physical restoration -was (and is) such as would
tend to decrease the employee's period of disability.
7. That the employee reached maximum of healing of the injury on
, 19 -.
8. That the employee as a result of the injury has specific loss as
follows:
A. - % loss of
(member of body)
9. That the employee as a result of the injury has a serious (bodily)
(head and facial) disfigurement which includes
(scars, gaits, or
postural defects, loss of organ or member of body)
10. That the employee died ) 19 -, and the death
(resulted) (did not result) proximately from
(incident and injury)
which occurred while the employee (was) (was not) engaged in
(work alleged)
_ on 19
11. That the employee left as (his) (her) only surviving whole depen-
dent(s) the following:
12. That the employee left no surviving dependents, and (his) (her)
next of kin are as follows:
13. That the
(funeral home)
of conducted the burial of the deceased employee, and
(city)
the charges therefor in the amount of $ (have) (have not)
been paid (by )
14. That the employee (did) (did not) sustain a hernia resulting from
injury by accident on 19., arising out of and in the
course of the employment in:
1962]
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that the accident (was) (was not) accompanied by pain, and that
there (was) (was not) an injury resulting in a hernia, and that
the hernia (did) (did not) immediately follow an accident, and
that the hernia (did) (did not) appear suddenly, and that the
hernia (did) (did not) exist prior to the accident.
15. That the claim for compensation (was) (was not) filed within one
(1) year after the accident of ,19_; and the defendant(s)
(is) (are) estopped to deny that the claim was timely filed due to
16. That the employee (did) (did not) give timely written notice of
the accident and the injury to the employer; (that the
(Nature of the injury)
employer had knowledge of the accident by oral report given by the
employee to the supervisor ( ) on or before
(Agent)
19 -;) and the employee (did have) (did not have) reasonable excuse
for not giving such timely written notice due to reasonable excuse of
and the employer (has) (has not) been prejudiced thereby due to
17. That the employee (did) (did not) undergo a change of physical
condition for the (worse) (better) on or about , 19 -,
in the following manner:
and as a result thereof (is) (is not) in need of medical treatment (See
Finding #6,) and has been disabled as follows:
18.
Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and under the Code of Laws of
South Carolina, 1952, Title 72 are the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. According to Section 72-14, the employee (did) (did not) sustain an
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment on
,19.
[Vol. 14
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2. According to Section 72-10, the employee (did) (did not) sustain
"disability" within the meaning of (that) (those) statutes(s).
3. (Any other definition sections as needed)
4. According to Section 72-301 and Section 72-302, the employer (did)
(did not) receive timely written notice of the employee's accident. (and the
employee (was) (was not) relieved of giving the required written notice
because (the employer (did have) (did not have) knowledge of the
accident and injury within thirty (30) days therefrom); (the employee
(did) (did not) establish reasonable excuse for not giving timely written
notice) ; (and the employee (did) (did not) establish that the employer
(was) (was not) prejudiced due to the untimely written notice.)
5. According to Section 72-303, the employee's claim for compensation
(is) (is not) properly within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commis-
sion for determination on the merits.
6. According to Section 72-305, the employee is entitled to the medical
care as specified therein for the period from the time of accidental injury
to , 19 _. (and thereafter as long as medical care
(date of hearing)
will tend to reduce the period of disability.)
7. According to Section 72-151, which governs compensation for total
disability, the employee is entitled to weekly compensation at the rate of
sixty (60%) percent of the pre-injury average weekly wage during
total disability, not to exceed the weekly maximum of $35.00, nor the
other maximum provisions of Title 72 (less the waiting period of seven (7)
days under Section 72-171.)
8. According to Section 72-152, which governs compensation for partial
disability, the employee is entitled to weekly compensation at the rate of
sixty (60%) percent of the decreased wage earning capacity during such
disability, not to exceed the weekly maximum of $35.00, nor the other
maximum provisions in Title 72.
9. According to Section 72-153 ( ) and ( ), the employee for the
specific loss of _% of the
(member of the body)
is entitled to compensation at the weekly rate of $
from ,19- for weeks.
10. According to Section 72-153 (18), the employee for the serious
(bodily) (head and facial) disfigurement is entitled to reasonable com-
pensation payable in a lump sum.
11. According to Section 72-14 and Section 72-180, the employee's death
is compensable, and the claimant(s)
(is) (are) entitled on account of the death of the employee to compen-
sation at the weekly rate of $ _ from , 19 _
13
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for a period of three hundred and fifty (350) weeks, not to exceed
$10,000.00, including $400.00 burial allowance as specified in Section
72-160. (and the claimants are each to share the weekly compensation
equally and alike).
12. According to Section 72-359, the Industrial Commission (does)
(does not) have jurisdiction to review the claim on the merits.
13. According to Section 72-154, the hernia claim (is) (is not) com-
pensable.
ORDER
A. IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the (employee) (claimant(s)
be, and it hereby is, denied, and the case is dismissed.
B, IT IS ORDERED that the defendant(s) pay to the (employee)
(claimant (s))
compensation as follows:
(1) total disability compensation at the weekly rate of $
for (the period from - , 19- to
19 -,) ( weeks) ; and
(2) total disability compensation at the weekly rate of $
from , 19 - to continue until such time as
(date of last hearing)
the employee, , returns to gainful
employment or until it is found by the South Carolina
Industrial Commission that total disability has ceased,
not to exceed the maximum provisions of the South Caro-
lina Workmen's Compensation Act.
(3) partial disability compensation at the weekly rate of
$ for (the period from , 19 - to
., 19 .) ( weeks); and
(4) specific disability compensation at the weekly rate of
$ - from - , 19 - for the period of
weeks for - percent specific loss of the
and
(5) serious (bodily) (facial and head) disfigurement compen-
sation in the amount of $ payable in a lump
sum.
(6) death compensation at the weekly rate of $
from , 19- for the period of three
hundred and fifty (350) weeks, not to exceed Ten Thousand
and no/100 ($10,000.00) Dollars, including Four Hundred
and no/100 ($400.00) Dollars burial allowance, which shall
be paid to
(Vol. 14
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(and the claimants are each to share the weekly compen-
sation equally and alike.) (and the compensation to the
minor(s) shall be paid through a general guardian.)
(7) death compensation in the commuted amount of $ -
less $. for burial expenses which shall be paid to
(and the claimants each shall share the weekly compen-
sation equally and alike.) (and the compensation to the
minor(s) shall be paid through a general guardian.)
C. IT IS ORDERED that the defendant(s) pay for the medical care-
and treatment of the injured employee as follows:
(1) all medical charges incurred for examination and treatment.
of the employee's
(type of injury or disease, back,
hernia, et cetera)
injury from the date of the injury , 19. to.
,19 . and
(2) thereafter to furnish medical care and treatment for the.
injury until such time as the employee reaches full recovery,.
or until it is found by the South Carolina Industrial Com-
mission that medical treatment will no longer tend to,
lessen the employee's period of disability, which results,
from the injury.
SOUTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Commissioner
Composed (October 1, 1959)
Revised (August 5, 1961)
by
JAMES J. REID
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